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DISHONEST ETHICAL ADVOCACY?:
FALSE DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL COURT
Joshua A. Liebman*
Up to this morning I believed most firmly in his innocence; and so did
many others as well as myself.
“I have sent for you, gentlemen,” said he, “to tell you I committed the
murder!”
When I could speak, which was not immediately, I said “Of course, then,
you are going to plead guilty?”
“No, sir,” was the reply, “I expect you to defend me to the utmost.”
We returned to our seats.1
Whatever the torments of his private morality, the lawyer has got to know
what the law of the land requires.2
Our criminal justice system aims to acquit the innocent and convict the
guilty. To facilitate these just outcomes, attorney ethics rules require
criminal defense attorneys to defend clients with the utmost loyalty and zeal
while taking care never to engage in dishonesty, fraud, or
misrepresentation. When a defense attorney knows a client is guilty, these
competing ethical duties present a dilemma: How and when, if at all, do
the rules of professional conduct permit or even require an attorney
knowingly to defend a guilty client?
This Note examines this dilemma and recent judicial approaches to it.
Judges disagree about how guilty criminal defendants should be permitted
to mount defenses at trial. Some have forbidden defense counsel from
knowingly advancing any false exculpatory proposition. Others have
permitted guilty defense attorneys to present sincere or truthful testimony in
order to bolster a falsehood. And still others have signaled more general

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Columbia
University. I am grateful for Professor Bruce Green’s patient guidance and the Law Review
staff’s fastidious diligence throughout this project. Most of all, I am grateful for my family’s
unconditional support.
1. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 133 (1973) (quoting SAMUEL
WARREN & CHARLES PHILLIPS, CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SAMUEL WARREN, ESQ.,
BARRISTER-AT-LAW, AND CHARLES PHILLIPS, ESQ., RELATIVE TO THE TRIAL OF COURVOISIER
11 (1849)).
2. Id. at 158.
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comfort with the idea that an attorney aggressively can pursue an acquittal
on behalf of a guilty client.
This Note seeks to resolve this issue by parsing the range of false defense
tactics available to attorneys and evaluating the propriety of each under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This Note reads the Model Rules in
the context of the adversary system’s twin aims to seek truth and safeguard
individual rights; it defines and categorizes specific false defense tactics;
and it offers practical, context-specific recommendations to courts and
attorneys evaluating knowingly false defenses as they occur in the real
world.
Rather than accepting or rejecting false defenses wholesale, this Note
argues that the best reading of the Model Rules permits some false defense
tactics and prohibits others. Specifically, this Note distinguishes false
defenses that adduce or rely on evidence known to be false from others that
do not: the former violate the Model Rules, while the latter comport with
them and facilitate the adversary system’s proper function. This distinction
accounts for important ethical differences between false defense tactics and
provides a workable, practical framework through which courts can
determine precisely how and when defense counsel should be allowed to
advocate on behalf of a guilty client.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a criminal defense attorney representing a client facing
the death penalty for murder.3 During the course of representation, you
have come to know that your client is guilty of shooting and killing the
victim in broad daylight at point-blank range: he credibly admitted guilt to
you during a privileged and confidential conversation. Your duties
competently and diligently to represent your client and to keep your client’s
confidences4 require that you pursue the best possible outcome on his
behalf—if possible, an acquittal. Yet you also seek to honor your duties of
candor to the court and fairness to the prosecution, which forbid you from
making or introducing false statements or evidence in court.5
You contemplate your options on the eve of trial. Can you ethically and
permissibly stand before the judge and jury and argue that your guilty client
did not, in fact, commit the crime? Can you call to the witness stand an
expert to sincerely but incorrectly testify that your client was not the person
seen on video committing capital murder, even though you know your
client is guilty? Can you argue or present evidence suggesting that an
innocent third party pulled the trigger? Or are you ethically constrained
merely to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses or, after hearing the
government’s case, only to argue to the jury that the prosecution has failed
to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? At what point, and
under what circumstances, do these forms of zealous advocacy transform
into instances of professional misconduct?
Professor Harry I. Subin defined a false defense as a “means attempting
to convince the judge or jury that facts established by the state and known
to the attorney to be true are not true, or that facts known to the attorney to

3. The following hypothetical is adapted from the facts of United States v. JiménezBencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 9–14 (1st Cir. 2015). For discussion and analysis of that case, see infra
Part III.C.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client.”); id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client’s behalf.”); id. r. 1.6 (discussing attorney-client confidentiality).
5. See id. r. 3.3 (discussing attorneys’ duty of candor to the courts); id. r. 3.4
(discussing attorneys’ duty of fairness to opposing parties and opposing counsel).

1322

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

be false are true.”6 The dilemma presented by such defenses, especially
when made by a lawyer who knows a client is guilty, predates the American
legal system and has plagued attorneys, ethicists, and legal scholars alike
throughout Anglo-American legal history.7 Writing in 1892, George D.
Watrous lamented that “[n]o problem in professional ethics has more
thoroughly distracted the conscientious student, and none is more
responsible for the ignorant and contemptuous opinion which really prevails
among many laymen, that no lawyer can be an honest man or that no honest
man can become a lawyer.”8 At the turn of the twentieth century, Louis J.
Rosenberg noted that “the status of the attorney to his guilty client[] is not
infrequently a matter causing him much perplexity.”9 Indeed, the earliest
American legal ethics treatises dedicated whole sections to defense ethics,
attorney candor, and related topics.10 These treatises aired both sides of the
debate: opinions ran the gamut from advocating for unbridled zealous
advocacy11 to arguing that guilty defendants deserved either the barest
defense or no defense at all.12 While recent decades have seen increasing
6. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the
“Right” to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (1987). But see John B.
Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin’s
Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission,” 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987)
(critiquing Subin’s definition of false defenses and his proposed answers to whether and
when false defenses should be allowed).
7. See, e.g., MELLINKOFF, supra note 1, at 141–45 (citing English letters and newspaper
articles dating to 1840 debating this topic).
8. George D. Watrous, The Moral Right to Defend the Guilty, 2 YALE L.J. 41, 44
(1892).
9. Louis J. Rosenberg, The Status of an Attorney Defending a Guilty Client, 10 YALE
L.J. 24, 24 (1900).
10. See, e.g., HERSCHEL WHITFIELD ARANT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE
AMERICAN BAR AND ITS ETHICS 234–58, 422–500 (1933); ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM, CASES
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 215–66 (1st ed. 1938); GEORGE P.
COSTIGAN, JR., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS 181–203 (1st ed. 1917);
GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 128–44 (1st ed. 1902).
11. See, e.g., CHEATHAM, supra note 10, at 194 (“A lawyer has no business with the
justice or injustice of the cause which he undertakes . . . . The justice or injustice of the
cause is to be decided by the judge.” (quoting Note, Dr. Johnson and the Law, 29 CAN. L.
TIMES 1021, 1021 (1909)); COSTIGAN, JR., supra note 10, at 320 (quoting a nineteenthcentury defense attorney who argued that if defense attorneys violated clients’ confidences
by revealing knowledge of clients’ guilt, “the relation of client and counsel will be deranged,
and their mutual confidence interrupted; the independence of the bar will be violated, and the
principle of advocacy will be abolished altogether”); WARVELLE, supra note 10, at 136
(“Before the law all men are equal, and guilty men have the same right to be defended and to
be represented by counsel as have the innocent.”); see also id., at 137 (derisively labeling as
“pseudo-moralists” those who criticized zealous defenders of the guilty).
12. See, e.g., CHEATHAM, supra note 10, at 197 (“No lawyer can work for the acquittal
of a client who has confessed to him his guilt . . . without ceasing to be professional and
ethical; nor can he, if such be his practice, assert himself to be an apostle of ‘law and order.’”
(quoting CARL F. TAEUSCH, PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ETHICS 64–66 (1926)); COSTIGAN,
JR., supra note 10, at 318–19 (“[I]f an accused person be really guilty, he has no moral right
to any defense. In him, any attempt to avoid punishment by a deception . . . is an additional
crime, instead of a justifiable act; and how can it be a virtue in his counsel to do that for him
which is a crime if done by himself?” (quoting Editorial, 4 JURIST 593, 594 (1840)));
WARVELLE, supra note 10, at 134–35 (“[I]n the minds of many, [knowingly defending a
guilty client] is the depth of professional infamy, and a lawyer who will so far lower himself

2016]

FALSE DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL COURT

1323

acceptance of the idea that false defenses can be ethical or even desirable,13
theorists continue in search of a final resolution to the false-defense
dilemma.14
While this intellectual debate has continued to simmer, some courts have
faced circumstances requiring concrete, real-world determinations of what
attorneys confronting the false-defense dilemma should be permitted to do
in court.15 In this context, judges have interpreted and applied rules
governing attorney conduct to fact-specific circumstances in which a
defendant’s liberty often hangs in the balance.16 Perhaps unsurprisingly
given the tenor of the scholarly discourse surrounding this topic, judicial
decisions addressing knowingly false defenses conflict and often beg the
question. Some courts have interpreted rules of professional conduct to
forbid all false defenses by which an attorney affirmatively advances any
proposition contrary to her client’s guilt.17 Yet the First Circuit recently
suggested that false defenses based on properly admitted evidence may be
permissible,18 and the Second Circuit sharply divided on the question of
whether, how, and when to allow a guilty criminal defendant to try to
convince a jury of his innocence.19
This Note argues that most of these courts’ analyses are misguided,
overly simplistic, or both, and it advocates for more nuanced judicial
analysis of false defenses’ ethical propriety. In short, it concludes that the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Model Rules”) are best read to
permit some false defense tactics and to prohibit others. Courts should
distinguish tactics that deliberately yield or rely on false evidence from
tactics that do not. The former—i.e., knowingly proffering or making use
of false evidence—violate the Model Rules and undermine the adversary
criminal process, while the latter—advancing false conclusions drawn from
evidence properly before the finder of fact—both comport with the Model
Rules and work to ensure our criminal process’s proper function. This Note
applies this distinction to the variety of trial circumstances in which defense
counsel might employ a false defense; it presents arguments for and against
judges permitting false defenses in each of these circumstances; and it
recommends a specific approach to each of these scenarios.

as to . . . continue in a case after such knowledge has been brought home to him, is regarded
as utterly depraved and destitute of moral feeling.”).
13. For a seminal work advancing this position, see generally Monroe H. Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions,
64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (arguing that a defense attorney should not hesitate to
zealously cross-examine truthful witnesses, should be permitted to call to the stand a client
who intends to testify falsely, and ethically may give legal advice to a client even when
doing so will tempt the client to commit perjury).
14. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and
Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1652 (2000).
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.A–B.
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.D.
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Part I introduces the underlying ethical responsibilities, rules, and
concepts relevant to this discussion. It discusses defense attorneys’
competing roles as zealous advocates and officers of the court. It then
introduces competing understandings of the adversary criminal process as
motivated by truth seeking on one hand and safeguarding individual rights
on the other. These dueling motivations mirror the defense attorney’s dual
ethical roles and should inform analyses of false defenses in the criminal
context.
Part II sets forth five varieties of false defense tactics that defense
counsel might seek to employ: putting the government to its proof, drawing
false inferences or advancing alternate theories, arguing actual innocence,
blame shifting, and eliciting perjury or knowingly submitting false
evidence. Part II defines each of these tactics and sets forth the specific
ethical questions and challenges each presents.
Part III describes four recent cases in which federal courts have grappled
with the ethics of knowingly false defenses. These cases tend to reveal
judicial hesitancy to permit false defenses.
Several suffer from
unsophisticated analyses of both the variety of false defense tactics and the
varied circumstances in which they may be employed.
Finally, Part IV distinguishes false defenses that adduce or rely on
evidence known to be false from those that are advanced through legal
arguments. Contextualizing and examining specific false defense tactics in
turn, Part IV sets forth and weighs the ethical considerations relevant to
them and recommends a judicial approach to each. It begins with the easy
boundary cases: putting the government to its proof always is allowed, and
eliciting perjury or knowingly submitting false evidence never is allowed.
Part IV then delves into the more challenging instances in which the falsedefense dilemma may arise in practice.
By parsing false defenses in this way, this Note strives to offer useful
practical guidance to attorneys and judges faced with the prospect of
employing or ruling on false defenses. Further, by considering these
defenses as they occur in the real world, this inquiry sheds new light on the
normative debate over the criminal advocate’s ideal balance between
loyalty to clients and loyalty to truth.
I. CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS AND ADVERSARY THEORY
Criminal defense attorneys necessarily occupy a unique—and uniquely
challenging—ethical position.20 They principally serve as advocates by
pursuing the most favorable outcomes possible for their clients.21 Yet they
also function as “officers of the court” charged with upholding the integrity
of the courts and the criminal process.22 This part introduces these often
20. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Judicial Rhetoric and Lawyers’ Roles, 90 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1989, 1997–98 (2015) (explaining that criminal defense attorneys’ duties to clients
often take precedence over their other ethical responsibilities).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also
infra Part I.B.
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2; see also infra Part I.A.2.
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competing responsibilities23 in the context of criminal advocacy, as well as
the Model Rules24 that govern defense counsel’s approaches to them. This
part then links these dual ethical responsibilities with two underlying and
often conflicting animating purposes of the adversary criminal process:
arriving at the truth25 and safeguarding individual rights.26 The Model
Rules’ requirements, restrictions, and guidance regarding false defenses are
best understood when read in the context of these twin systemic aims,
which find themselves directly and unavoidably at odds in the false defense
context.27
A. The Defense Attorney as Zealous Advocate
This section sets forth defense attorneys’ ethical duties as zealous
advocates for their clients.
1. Diligence and Zeal
Like all attorneys, criminal defense counsel must “act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”28 This mandate
contemplates “whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”29 In addition to diligence in tactics,
the Model Rules instruct defense attorneys to bear an attitude of
commitment, dedication, and zeal toward both their clients’ interests and
their own efforts to realize them.30 One apt and well-known gloss on this
duty of zealous advocacy comes from the distinguished nineteenth-century
English attorney Lord Henry Brougham, who described it during the
notorious 1820 English trial known as Queen Caroline’s Case:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he

23. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978
DUKE L.J. 921, 922–25 (describing the persistent problem of locating a proper balance
between these two responsibilities).
24. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are promulgated by the American Bar
Association and inform the standards of professional conduct enacted by the vast majority of
U.S. jurisdictions. See States Making Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Dates of Adoption, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting
_model_rules.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K8QA-W2B3].
25. See infra Part I.C.1.
26. See infra Part I.C.2.
27. Cf. Pye, supra note 23, at 924–25 (arguing that defense attorneys’ dual roles are best
balanced “by examining the purposes of the criminal process and the degree to which
different defense tactics contribute to or impede the achievement of those purposes”).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); accord
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
standard 4-1.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“Defense counsel should act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
30. Id.
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must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may
bring upon others.31

In short, the ethical defense attorney demonstrates undivided loyalty to
her client and strives to achieve her client’s goals to the fullest possible
extent.
2. Confidentiality
In addition to zeal, confidentiality and full disclosure also are central to
the attorney-client relationship. An attorney must keep clients’ confidences
by not revealing any “information relating to the representation of a client”
without first obtaining the client’s informed consent.32 Confidentiality long
has been recognized as a fundamental legal ethical duty.33 Indeed, the
current iteration of the Model Rules marks confidentiality as a
“fundamental principle . . . [that] contributes to the trust that is the hallmark
of the client-lawyer relationship.”34 Without the protection offered by
attorney-client confidentiality, a client might withhold relevant information
from his attorney for fear of saying something that later could be used
against him, hampering his attorney from mounting the best possible
defense—and potentially depriving the client of sound legal advice that
only a well-informed attorney could provide.35
B. The Defense Attorney as Officer of the Court
In addition to serving as zealous advocates, defense attorneys bear the
responsibility of acting as “officers of the court.”36 As such, the Model
31. TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE: PART II, at 3 (N.Y., James Cockcroft & Co. 1874); see
also id. at 1649 n.18 (collecting references in the criminal ethics literature to this famous
quotation).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-3.1 (describing
defense attorneys’ duty of confidentiality to their clients). Attorneys also must make
reasonable efforts to avoid unintentional or unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c). But see id. r. 1.6(b) (establishing
seven exceptions to the duty of confidentiality).
33. See, e.g., Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confidences: Punishing the
Innocent, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 186–87, 189–90 (1990) (tracing the origins of American
attorney-client confidentiality to eighteenth-century English law and noting that the
American Bar Association’s original ethics canons forbade attorneys from disclosing client
confidences); Brandon P. Ruben, Note, Should the Medium Affect the Message?: Legal and
Ethical Implications of Prosecutors Reading Inmate-Attorney Email, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
2131, 2140 (2015).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2.
35. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978); see also, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-3.1(a) (“Defense
counsel should explain the necessity of full disclosure of all facts known to the client for an
effective defense, and defense counsel should explain the extent to which counsel’s
obligation of confidentiality makes privileged the accused’s disclosures.”); id. standard 43.2(a)–(b) (instructing defense counsel to interview clients to “determine all relevant facts
known to the accused” and that, in so doing, defense counsel should not suggest that the
client not be candid).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2.
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Rules require that they “avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the
adjudicative process,”37 a category that includes knowingly making a false
statement of fact or law in court38 or knowingly offering false evidence.39
A defense attorney also may not act unfairly toward an adversary by,
among other things, falsifying evidence or counseling or assisting a witness
to offer false testimony.40 These proscriptions accord with the Model
Rules’ general admonition that an attorney must not “commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects”41 or, more generally still, to refrain from
“conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”42
Defense attorneys therefore must maintain a delicate balance. The Model
Rules require that they advocate fiercely on each client’s behalf, but they
must never advocate too fiercely by engaging in behavior or tactics that
impede, discredit, or derail the criminal process.
C. Truth Versus Rights?:
Two Goals of the Adversary System
The adversary criminal process itself synthesizes competing goals that
parallel the criminal defense advocate’s twin responsibilities to the client
and to truth. Scholars who seek to account for the aims of the American
criminal justice system emphasize a wide range of animating purposes,
including truth seeking, affording procedural fairness, minimizing the
incidence of factually inaccurate verdicts, safeguarding individual rights,
enforcing and reasserting societal values and norms, advancing defendants’
dignity and autonomy, and incentivizing parties to negotiate settlements or

37. Id.
38. Id. r. 3.3(a); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-1.2(f) (“Defense counsel should not intentionally
misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court.”).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-7.5(a) (“Defense
counsel should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible
evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to take reasonable remedial measures upon
discovery of its falsity.”). Because the Model Rules define knowledge as actual knowledge,
an attorney can violate these prohibitions only if she subjectively knows that a statement or
piece of evidence is false. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (also noting that
actual knowledge “may be inferred from circumstances” and so need not be proven by direct
evidence).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(b); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-7.5(a) (“Defense
counsel should not knowingly offer false . . . testimony of witnesses, or fail to take
reasonable remedial measures upon discovery of its falsity.”); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-3.7(b) (“Defense
counsel should not counsel a client in or knowingly assist a client to engage in conduct
which defense counsel knows to be illegal or fraudulent but defense counsel may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client.”).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b).
42. Id. r. 8.4(d).
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pleas.43 This section highlights two of these systemic aims that are of
especial relevance to the false-defense dilemma: arriving at the truth and
safeguarding individual rights.
This section discusses competing
understandings of the adversary process that focus on one of these goals
and then sets forth the implications of these views in the context of the
false-defense dilemma.
1. Arriving at the Truth
One principal goal of the criminal process is, of course, to arrive at the
truth—in other words, to determine whether the defendant actually
committed the crime or crimes charged.44 From this perspective, then, the
criminal justice system’s adversarial structure should be understood as a
means to uncovering what actually happened.45 Assigning zealous
advocates to the prosecution and defense ensures that both sides’ strongest
arguments will be made at trial, best positioning the fact-finder to assess a
defendant’s guilt.46 By its terms, this normative framework values rules,
standards, and procedures governing criminal procedure that facilitate truth
seeking; and its enthusiasts view rules, standards, and procedures that serve
to obfuscate the truth as antithetical to the criminal justice system’s
principal goal.47
Focusing now on criminal defense counsel, those who prioritize the
criminal process’s truth-seeking function would favor constraints on
defense attorneys that (they believe) aid the criminal process in its mission
43. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987); see also Suni, supra note 14, at 1650–51, 1651 n.23.
For an introduction to the adversary theory literature, see Goodpaster, supra, at 118 n.1
(collecting seminal works in the field and notable scholarly responses to them).
44. E.g., Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False Look True,
41 SW. L.J. 1135, 1138 (1988) (“[T]hat the objective of a trial under the adversary system is
the determination of truth would on its face seem unexceptionable if not self-evident.”).
45. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1975) (“It is said, commonly by judges, that ‘[t]he basic purpose of a
trial is the determination of truth.’” (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 416 (1966) (alteration in original))); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy
and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1486–87 (1966) (“[T]he advocate
plays his role well when zeal for his client’s cause promotes a wise and informed decision of
the case.” (quoting Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.
J. 1159, 1160–61 (1958))); Pye, supra note 23, at 926 (arguing that “[c]onduct that is
intended to, or is likely to, result in the suppression of truth, or which is designed to mislead
a court or jury or to facilitate a falsehood, should be presumptively improper” because
“objectives of the system [other than truth seeking] must themselves be re-examined if in
concert they preclude the ascertainment of truth”).
46. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 43, at 121 (describing the view that “[t]ruth is best
discovered by powerful statements on both sides of a question” (quoting United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (alteration in original))). But see, e.g., MELLINKOFF, supra
note 1, at 4 (asserting that “[w]e assume or pretend that a system of justice is nothing more
than a search for the truth despite abundant evidence around us and inside us that points in
another direction”); Frankel, supra note 45, at 1036 (questioning whether the adversary
system is as effective at truth seeking as commonly believed).
47. See, e.g., Noonan, Jr., supra note 45, at 1486–87 (“[T]he advocate plays his role well
when zeal for his client’s cause promotes a wise and informed decision of the case.” (quoting
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Join Conference, supra note 45, at 1160–61)).
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to uncover the truth. If truth seeking were the criminal justice system’s sole
mission, a defense attorney who knew her client was guilty would not be
permitted to employ any defense tactic intended to conceal this truth from
the jury in hopes of winning an undeserved acquittal. From the perspective
of the Model Rules, these constraints would arise from defense counsel’s
role as an officer of the court,48 which, on this thinking, trump the
attorney’s responsibility diligently to serve as a guilty client’s zealous
advocate49: an attorney who knowingly propounds a false proposition
impedes truth seeking, and the rules of professional conduct should
proscribe attorney conduct that undermines this systemic goal.50
2. Safeguarding Individual Rights
A second animating purpose of the criminal justice system is the
protection of defendants’ individual rights, including the rights of
defendants who are known by their attorneys to be guilty.51 Legal scholars
who prioritize this goal commonly emphasize the importance of the
adversary process in shielding individual rights from government
overreach.52 By imposing what Professor John B. Mitchell has described as
a series of “screens” on the government’s prosecutorial power, the criminal
process ensures that the government imposes punishment only when it can
prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.53 This positivist,
normative standard is best understood, according to Mitchell, as “the
symbol we have chosen to represent th[e] line between societally acceptable
and unacceptable levels of certainty and doubt in the mind of the fact finder

48. See supra Part I.A.2.
49. See supra Part I.A.1.
50. See, e.g., Subin, supra note 6, at 125 (arguing for a rule of professional conduct
banning defense counsel from attempting to refute a fact established by the prosecution
when defense counsel knows the fact to be true beyond a reasonable doubt); see also
Randolph Braccialarghe, Why Were Perry Mason’s Clients Always Innocent?: The Criminal
Lawyer’s Moral Dilemma—The Criminal Defendant Who Tells His Lawyer He Is Guilty, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 77 (2004) (arguing that the Model Rules should be amended to forbid
false defenses on behalf of clients known to be guilty because “[e]fforts by lawyers to secure
the acquittal of the guilty do not benefit the law abiding members of society, victims, or even
the falsely or mistakenly accused; the main beneficiaries are guilty defendants and, to some
extent, the pocket books of criminal defense lawyers themselves”). But see, e.g., Mitchell,
supra note 6 (critiquing Subin’s conclusions and arguing that defense attorneys should be
permitted to advance false interpretations of the prosecution’s evidence); Harry I. Subin, Is
This Lie Necessary?: Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 689, 690 (1988) [hereinafter Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?] (responding to
Mitchell’s critique).
51. For an informative introduction to this school of thought, see Suni, supra note 14, at
1649–51 & nn.17–29.
52. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 342; cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search
for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1064–65 & nn.18–22 (1975) (quoting several U.S.
Supreme Court decisions recognizing that, as zealous advocates, defense attorneys often
must engage in conduct that does not promote the truth).
53. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 347; see also John Kaplan, Defending Guilty People,
7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 223, 229–34 (1986) (describing this “checking function” by which
“the criminal process . . . check[s] and regulate[s] its own institutions”).
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when deciding a criminal case.”54 Unlike a system dedicated to uncovering
the truth, an adversarial system engineered to protect individual rights more
readily would permit defense attorneys to challenge the prosecution’s
evidence by knowingly advancing false propositions. That rare case in
which a defense attorney knowingly convinces the fact-finder that the
government has not proven a guilty defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt serves the invaluable societal function of reinforcing systemic
constraints on prosecutorial power.55
To be sure, many legal ethicists and adversarial theorists cannot neatly be
separated into one or the other of these two categories. Rather than
presenting a detailed taxonomy of competing views on the nature of the
American adversary system, however, this part focuses on truth seeking and
protecting individual rights because these goals so closely mirror defense
counsel’s ethical duties as officers of the court and advocates for their
clients, respectively. The zealous advocate strives to safeguard her client’s
individual rights, checking prosecutorial power by fighting for her client to
the fullest permissible extent.56 The officer of the court maintains the
integrity of the courts and criminal process by refraining from unfair or
dishonest practices or knowingly relying on dishonest testimony or false
evidence, even—and especially—when doing so would benefit her client at
the expense of the adversary process’s truth-seeking function.57
Correspondingly, while an ardent truth seeker deplores successful false
defenses for deliberately transgressing the criminal process’s truth-seeking
function, a theorist or practitioner prioritizing defendants’ individual rights
not only finds false defenses desirable but also believes they reify a core
systemic value.
II. FALSE DEFENSES INTRODUCED
False defenses encompass a wide range of tactics, from affirmatively
stating that a guilty client is innocent to seeking to undermine truthful
adverse evidence by more subtle means.58 Bearing in mind the ethical roles
and systemic aims introduced above,59 this part introduces the range of
false defense tactics that defense counsel may employ. This part does so in
the following order: first, passively putting the government to its proof;
second, expounding false inferences drawn from admitted evidence; third,
falsely asserting a guilty client’s actual innocence of a crime; fourth,
54. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 343.
55. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Reflections on the Ethics of Representing Clients Whose
Aims Are Unjust, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 55, 57 (1999) (“It is true that acquittal enables the
criminal to escape just punishment; but his client’s acquittal can be sought by the lawyer for
other reasons, namely, the preservation of his client’s legal rights and the protection of the
integrity of the legal process.”).
56. See supra Part I.A.1.
57. See supra Part I.A.2.
58. For an illustration of a less direct false defense, see Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?,
supra note 50, at 691 (juxtaposing and analyzing two hypothetical defense closing
arguments knowingly made on behalf of a guilty client).
59. See supra Part I.
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shifting blame by falsely suggesting the guilt of a third party; and fifth,
knowingly introducing false evidence or eliciting false testimony favorable
to a guilty client’s case. It is important to note that these five categories
bleed into one another in practice.60 Nonetheless, this part aims to account
for all common varieties of false defenses and, by juxtaposing them, to
convey important differences between these strategies that courts and
attorneys should consider when evaluating these tactics’ ethical propriety.61
A. Putting the Government to Its Proof
First, a defense attorney puts the government to its proof simply by
arguing that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. In so doing, defense counsel need neither suggest that the defendant
is innocent nor advance any other false proposition—or, really, set forth any
affirmative proposition whatsoever. Indeed, the most passive way to put
the government to its proof is simply to argue to the jury that the
prosecution’s case is insufficient to support a conviction. Defense counsel
naturally might choose to highlight specific reasons why this is so—for
example, by highlighting gaps, inconsistencies, or other problems with the
prosecution’s evidence or theory of the case. This Note categorizes an
approach that limits itself merely to observing such deficiencies as putting
the government to its proof; but it labels the tactic of illustrating such
deficiencies by arguing specific counterfactuals as drawing false
inferences.62
Putting the government to its proof does not require defense counsel to
convince the fact-finder of a falsehood or to undermine a truthful
proposition. Indeed, perhaps for this reason, putting the government to its
proof always is permitted even on behalf of a client known to be guilty, for
the prosecution’s duty to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is meaningless unless defense counsel can argue that this burden has
not been satisfied.63 For this reason, failing to put the government to its
proof constitutes a dereliction of zealous advocacy amounting to a violation
of Model Rule 1.3.64

60. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1759–62 (1993).
61. See infra Part IV.
62. See infra Part II.B (discussing false inferences).
63. E.g., Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 271 (2006) (explaining that “[i]t is universally
accepted that the defense lawyer can put the government to its proof—a process that could
well result in a not-guilty verdict if,” for example, “a crucial witness fails to appear or
testifies poorly or if important physical evidence is unavailable”).
64. Suni, supra note 14, at 1653 (“[T]here is no serious dispute that when a defendant
chooses to go to trial, the criminal defense lawyer has an obligation to represent the
defendant, whether guilty or not, so as to require the government to meet its constitutionally
mandated burden of proof.” (footnotes omitted)); see also supra Part I.A.1 (describing the
duty of zealous advocacy imposed by Model Rule 1.3).
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B. Drawing False Inferences
Second, a defense attorney draws a false inference (or advances an
alternate theory) when she submits to the fact-finder a false conclusion that
is drawn or arises from truthful evidence (or, more accurately, evidence or
testimony not known by defense counsel to be false). While an attorney
advancing an alternate theory need not directly make a false statement, the
goal is to convince the fact-finder of a conclusion that defense counsel
knows to be false; in other words, “weakening the persuasiveness” of the
prosecution’s case by raising possibilities favorable to the client.65
Professor David Luban characterizes this tactic as “[s]uggesting reasonable
doubts,” which he points out often elides in practice into knowingly
advancing a false conclusion, impeaching a witness known to be testifying
truthfully, or “[s]aying things that are literally true but drastically
misleading.”66 The goal here is to convince the fact-finder that a false
narrative favorable to the defendant cannot be disproven beyond a
reasonable doubt by affirmatively pointing out specific ways in which the
government has failed to prove its case.67
Some commentators separate false inferences into two categories:
inferences intended to show how the prosecution has failed to carry its
burden of proof and inferences “used for their probative value.”68 The
difference between these two forms of false inference often is subtle.69 As
an example of the former, consider a defense attorney who argues to the
jury that, based on the prosecution’s evidence, it cannot be known beyond a
reasonable doubt whether the (guilty) defendant actually committed the
crime.70 This form of false inference is widely accepted as an appropriate
means by which to put the government to its proof because defense counsel
simply is illustrating with particularity ways in which the prosecution has
failed to make its case.71
65. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 346 (emphasis omitted).
66. Luban, supra note 60, at 1759–62. Luban expressed ambivalence as to the propriety
of these tactics. See id.
67. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 346.
68. Suni, supra note 14, at 1656 & n.54. But see id. at 1656 n.55 (noting Luban’s
argument that this distinction “is so artificial that it can never form the basis for drawing the
magic moral line” (quoting Luban, supra note 60, at 1760–61)).
69. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 60, at 1760; see also supra note 68. However, it should
be noted that if defense counsel offensively advances a falsehood not supportable by any
admitted evidence, she may approach advancing the type of false statement banned by
Model Rule 3.3. See supra Part I.B (introducing and discussing Model Rule 3.3).
70. For a more specific counterfactual, see Mitchell, supra note 6, at 345 (offering a
hypothetical defense closing on behalf of a guilty client that concludes, “So, maybe she did
[commit the crime]. On the other hand, . . . maybe she didn’t. . . . The prosecution has the
burden, and he simply can’t carry any burden let alone ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ with a
maybe she did, maybe she didn’t case”). But see Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, supra note
50, at 691–92 (critiquing Mitchell’s argument and asserting that, while this closing’s
message is not a lie, “it certainly creates a false impression, which amounts to the same
thing”).
71. Suni, supra note 14, at 1656 & n.55; cf. id. at 1654 n.45 (explaining that juries
commonly are thought to construct and evaluate the prosecution’s and defense’s competing
stories of the case and noting that “to a large extent[,] the benefits to a defendant of the
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The latter form of false inference—one relied upon by defense counsel
for its purported truth—by its terms seeks to deceptively convince the factfinder of its truthfulness. This tactic is more controversial in the legal
ethics literature.72 As an example, consider an attorney who exploits a
deficiency in the prosecution’s evidence by arguing that a truthful
eyewitness did not actually observe the defendant committing the crime.
Indeed, in practice this tactic often occurs when a defense attorney subjects
a truthful witness to dogged cross-examination intended to impugn the
witness’s credibility.73 Though scholarly minds may differ as to these
inferences’ ethical propriety, in practice, attorneys are not disciplined for
propounding them, indicating that doing so most likely does not run afoul
of the Model Rules.74
C. Arguing Actual Innocence
Third, a defense attorney argues actual innocence by affirmatively
submitting that a guilty defendant did not actually commit the crime with
which he has been charged.75 This tactic is best understood as a specific
variant of false inferences advanced for their purported truthfulness.76
When a defendant’s guilt is clear, defense counsel can argue actual
innocence only by introducing or relying upon false evidence, which is an
approach as plainly impermissible as it is ethically uninteresting.77 Of
particular relevance to this Note, however, are cases in which a defense
attorney argues actual innocence by relying on evidence that she does not
know to be false.
One oft-cited example of such a defense is found in a Michigan ethics
opinion offering guidance to a defense attorney preparing to defend at trial a
client who credibly, privately, and confidentially had admitted guilt.78 This
devious defendant divulged to his attorney that he had knocked his victim
unconscious and stolen the victim’s watch so that the victim would have an
incorrect sense of when the crime occurred.79 Defense counsel wondered if
he ethically could call as alibi witnesses friends of the defendant who
truthfully would place the defendant away from the crime scene during the
time when the victim mistakenly believed the crime took place.80 Noting
that these alibi witnesses would testify truthfully and that “[o]ne cannot
suborn the truth,” the ethics committee concluded that the defense attorney
government being required to carry a high burden of proof may be negated unless the
defense can present its own version of the case”).
72. See id. at 1656 & n.54, 1658–59, 1658 nn.62–64.
73. Cf. id. at 1657–58 & nn.59–61 (comparing such hostile cross-examination to the
tactic of shifting blame).
74. Id. at 1663 n.91.
75. This Note classifies arguments of actual innocence in which defense counsel
knowingly shifts blame onto an innocent third party as falling within the “blame shifting”
category of false defenses. See infra Part II.D for a discussion of that tactic.
76. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
77. See infra Part II.E (discussing perjury and knowingly submitting false evidence).
78. Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-1164 (1987).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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ethically could present the false defense.81 Unlike a defense attorney who
draws a false inference, an attorney arguing actual innocence attempts
directly and deceptively to convince the jury of her client’s innocence.
Such an assertion aims squarely to undercut the truth-seeking purpose of a
criminal trial82 by challenging offensively and falsely the crux of the
prosecution’s case.
D. Shifting Blame
Fourth, a defense attorney shifts blame by presenting what many refer to
as the “SODDI” defense: “Some Other Dude Did It.”83 This tactic can
include introducing evidence tending to falsely demonstrate another’s
involvement in or commission of the crime, or, on rare occasion, evidence
that another party has committed similar crimes in the past.84 One variation
of this tactic, which Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried refers to as the
“SODDI defense 2.0,” is to submit evidence showing that the police failed
diligently to investigate another party who might have committed the
crime.85 Many commentators view blame shifting on behalf of a client
whom defense counsel knows to be guilty as especially undesirable because
of this tactic’s potential to inflict harm on the innocent third party who the
defense attorney argues is guilty.86 However, Professor Ellen Yankiver
Suni concludes in her persuasive treatment of the blame-shifting tactic that
the rules and standards of professional conduct do not prohibit it and in fact
may even require it when defense counsel is not certain of a client’s guilt.87
E. Perjury and Knowingly Submitting False Evidence
Finally, a defense attorney might knowingly elicit false testimony or
submit false evidence. Such tactics are outlawed both by criminal statutes
and by ethics rules, as they universally are recognized as detrimental to the

81. Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 327, 367 n.176 (1998) (assessing favorably the ethics committee’s reasoning).
82. See supra Part I.C.1.
83. E.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence of a Third Party’s Guilt of the Crime That
the Accused Is Charged With: The Constitutionalization of the SODDI (Some Other Dude
Did It) Defense 2.0, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 91, 92 (2015). See generally Suni, supra note 14
(compiling, analyzing, and critiquing the evidentiary rules and rules of professional conduct
that restrict the use of the SODDI defense and arguing that courts should more readily permit
defense counsel to engage in blame shifting).
84. Imwinkelried, supra note 83, at 99–102 (explaining that evidence of another party’s
similar prior criminal acts rarely, though occasionally, is admissible).
85. Id. at 105.
86. See Suni, supra note 14, at 1658–59, 1658 nn.62–64. To the extent that false
defenses are rationalized by their role in protecting a defendant’s individual rights, this
justification cannot account for the potential damage that blame shifting inflicts on the
innocent third party, including potentially exposing that party to future criminal investigation
or prosecution. Id. at 1658 & n.64; see also supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the aim of protecting
individual rights).
87. See Suni, supra note 14, at 1659.
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proper functioning of the criminal justice system.88 Thus, for the purposes
of this Note, perjury and the like are of minimal ethical interest.
III. MALUM IN SE?:
RECENT RULINGS ON FALSE DEFENSES
Bearing these tactics in mind, this part describes several recent federal
cases that address whether defense attorneys knowingly may advance a
false defense on behalf of a guilty client. In two of these cases, United
States v. Lauersen89 and United States v. Burnett,90 the courts held that false
defenses are proscribed outright by state-law equivalents of the relevant
ABA Model and Disciplinary Rules.91 In the third case, United States v.
Jiménez-Bencevi,92 the First Circuit avoided grappling directly with the
ethics of false defenses by circumventing for defense attorneys working on
capital cases the knowledge requirement otherwise imposed by
Massachusetts’s Rules of Professional Conduct.93 Finally, in Poventud v.
City of New York,94 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
sitting en banc, split 9–6 regarding the propriety of false defenses in
criminal trials.95
A. United States v. Lauersen
In Lauersen, two codefendants were charged with committing health
insurance fraud.96 At least one defendant, Magda Binion, elected to attend
a pretrial proffer session with prosecutors during which she confessed her
guilt in a sworn, written statement.97 Before offering her proffer statement,
88. Subin, supra note 6, at 126 & n.12, 145 n.91. A particularly challenging case arises
when a criminal defendant seeks to exercise his right to testify in his own defense and his
attorney knows he intends to do so falsely. This heavily debated scenario is beyond the
scope of this Note; but for a useful introduction to the client perjury ethics literature, see
generally Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing
Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935 (2002).
89. No. 98CR1134 (WHP), 2000 WL 1693538 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000); see infra Part
III.A.
90. No. 08-201-03, 2009 WL 2180373 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2009); see infra Part III.B.
91. See Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8; see also Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *4–
5; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
92. 788 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2015).
93. See infra Part III.C.
94. 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
95. See infra Part III.D.
96. See generally Indictment, Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538 (No. 98 CR 1134 (WHP)),
2000 WL 35630186.
97. See Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *1. Proffer sessions are a means by which
some criminal defendants try to convince prosecutors to offer a guilty plea in exchange for a
more lenient sentence. A proffer is a written or oral statement made during a proffer session
in which the defendant admits guilt, tells his side of the story, or provides other information
that the prosecutor may find useful or compelling—for example, information that would
make the defendant a valuable confidential informant. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Naftalis, Note,
“Queen for a Day” Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal
Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 6–8 (2003) (describing how, when,
why, and under what legal conditions these proffers take place).
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Binion signed a waiver permitting the government to use it “for the purpose
of cross-examination should [the defendant] testify, or to rebut any
evidence or arguments offered by or on behalf of [the defendant] . . . at any
stage of the criminal prosecution.”98
Binion and the prosecution presumably could not reach a plea agreement,
and the case against her proceeded to trial. Before the trial began, defense
counsel moved the court to preclude the government from introducing
Binion’s inculpatory proffer statement into evidence.99
The parties argued over the enforceability of the waiver.100 In addition to
arguing that the waiver enabled it to use Binion’s statement at trial, the
government argued that the applicable rules of professional conduct
prohibited Binion’s attorney from “adducing evidence of Binion’s ‘actual
innocence’”101 because Binion’s statements during her proffer session left
her attorney with no “good-faith basis”102 to argue she did not commit the
crimes with which she had been charged.103 The government contended
that ethics rules required Binion’s attorney to passively put the government
to its proof or elicit evidence and argue points that did not conflict with
Binion’s inadmissible admission of guilt.104
The trial court denied in part and granted in part Binion’s motion.105
While the court first found that the waiver was unenforceable,106 it
nonetheless held that the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional
Responsibility107 precluded defense counsel from advancing at trial any
proposition that contradicted Binion’s proffer statement.108 In so holding,
the court summarily cited the rule of professional conduct that governed an
attorney’s “[r]epresent[ation] [of] a [c]lient [w]ithin the [b]ounds of the

98. Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *2.
99. Id. at *1.
100. Id. at *1, *4.
101. Id. at *5.
102. Id.; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The
prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence
is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation
to the trier of fact.”); supra note 39 and accompanying text (citing the Model Rules’
definition of knowledge).
103. Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *5.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *1.
106. See id. at *7 (finding that “the facts strongly suggest that Binion did not fully
understand the potential consequences of the extent to which the Government could use her
statements to ‘rebut’ evidence or arguments presented on her behalf” when she signed the
waiver).
107. The New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, first enacted in 1970,
was based on the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility, which
also was adopted that year. Chris G. McDonough & Michael L. Epstein, Regulating Attorney
Conduct: Specific Statutory Schemes v. General Regulatory Guidelines, 11 TOURO L. REV.
609, 611 & n.7 (1995). New York’s code was supplanted in 2009 by the current New York
Rules of Professional Conduct. See N.Y. COMP CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2009).
108. See Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8; cf. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3
(2013).
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[l]aw.”109 Among other things, this rule forbade attorneys from knowingly
using perjured testimony or false evidence,110 knowingly making a false
statement of law or fact,111 “[p]articipat[ing] in the creation . . . of evidence
when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false,”112 or
“assist[ing] the client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.”113 The trial court reasoned that its “duty . . . to protect the
integrity of the proceeding and to ensure that matters presented to the jury
are grounded in good faith” compelled it to preclude Binion’s attorney from
eliciting testimony from any witness or making any argument to the jury at
any stage of Binion’s trial that “directly contradict[ed] specific factual
statements made by Binion” in her proffer statement, unless Binion’s
attorney had a “good-faith basis” for doing so.114 New York’s Disciplinary
Rule 7-102, cited with a “see, e.g.,” signal, was the only authority offered in
support of this holding.115
The Lauersen court stressed the “integrity” of the criminal process in
summarily holding that a defense attorney may not argue a client’s
innocence if she knows the client is guilty.116 Under this reasoning, any
knowingly false defense necessarily undermines the criminal process; and
under the court’s one-sentence analysis of the ethical issues at play, this
effect is undesirable and impermissible across the board.117
B. United States v. Burnett
Nearly nine years after Lauersen, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
considered the same issue in Burnett.118 There, the defendant was charged
with federal crimes arising from a series of robberies affecting interstate
commerce.119 Like the defendant in Lauersen, the Burnett defendant made
sworn, inculpatory proffer statements on two occasions, both of which were
governed by a proffer agreement120 that the court later deemed
unenforceable.121

109. N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (2007) (repealed 2009); see
Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8.
110. N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4).
111. Id. DR 7-102(A)(5).
112. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6).
113. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
114. Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. United States v. Burnett, No. 08-201-03, 2009 WL 2180373 (E.D. Pa. July 17,
2009).
119. See id. at *1 (referring to “a series of Hobbs Act robberies”); see also, e.g., 5 DEP’T
OF JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 9, no. 2402 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining that the Hobbs Act “prohibits
actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce”).
120. The proffer agreement provided, in pertinent part,
if your client is a witness or party at any trial or other legal proceedings [sic] and
testifies or makes representations through counsel materially different from
statements made or information provided during the “off-the-record” proffer, the
government may cross-examine your client, introduce rebuttal evidence and make
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Like the court in Lauersen122—which the Burnet Court cited repeatedly
in its ruling123—the Burnett Court then considered whether defense counsel
ethically could advance at trial a proposition that contradicted the
defendant’s sworn confession.124 Citing Pennsylvania’s equivalents of
Model Rules 3.1, 3.3(a), and 3.4,125 the court held that “[a]bsent a goodfaith basis, within the operation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct, Mr. Burnett’s counsel may not present evidence or arguments on
Mr. Burnett’s behalf that directly contradict the admissions made by Mr.
Burnett during his proffer sessions.”126 As in Lauersen, the court offered
no support or explanation for this holding beyond a quotation from and
citation to the relevant ethics rules.127 Without anything further, the court
seems to have taken for granted that a knowingly false defense necessarily
constitutes unethical attorney conduct.128 Though the court expressed some
sympathy as to the “frustration” its ruling might cause Burnett’s attorney as
he attempted somehow to mount a zealous trial defense, the court
nonetheless reasoned that lawyers often face difficult challenges and that
“[s]killed lawyers . . . distinguish themselves—and will serve their clients—
precisely because they see the dilemma ahead of time and can try to make
the best of the circumstances as presented.”129 The Burnett Court, then,
read the Model Rules as proscribing false defenses of all kinds and warned
defense counsel that the ethical attorney does not knowingly employ them.
C. United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi:
When Judges Close Their Eyes to the Truth
The First Circuit recently adopted a different approach to the falsedefense dilemma in Jiménez-Bencevi.130 The defendant in that case faced
capital charges arising from a fatal shooting captured on surveillance

representations based on statements made or information provided during the “offthe-record” proffer.
Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *1 (alteration in original).
121. See id. at *4.
122. See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text.
123. See Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *3–4.
124. See id. at *4–5.
125. 204 PA. CODE § 81.4, rr. 3.1, 3.3(a), 3.4 (2016); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT rr. 3.1, 3.3(a), 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
126. Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *5.
127. See id.
128. The court further noted that, in light of this holding, “it may well be in this instance
that the defendant’s waiver through the proffer agreement would not have restricted counsel
any more than he was already bound by the rules of professional conduct.” Id. at *5 n.6; see
also supra note 120 (reproducing the relevant terms of Burnett’s proffer agreement). The
extent to which prosecutors should be able to use proffer agreements to limit a defendant’s
trial defense is beyond the scope of this Note. For an incisive treatment of the topic, see
generally Naftalis, supra note 97. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasizing the Burnett Court’s
suggestion that Rule 3.3 may ban knowingly false defenses just as thoroughly as if the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily had waived any right to present them.
129. Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *5 n.6.
130. United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2015).
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video.131 Jiménez-Bencevi offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life
sentence rather than facing the death penalty at trial.132 As a precondition
to agreeing to accept a guilty plea, the prosecution required JiménezBencevi to make a sworn proffer statement admitting in detail his guilt of
the crimes charged and also providing “any known information regarding
other federal offenders.”133 Though Jiménez-Bencevi initially assented and
made a proffer statement that included admissions of guilt, plea
negotiations broke down, and the case proceeded to trial.134
At trial, defense counsel sought to introduce the testimony of a forensic
expert who had reviewed the surveillance footage of the killing.135 This
expert—who did not know about Jiménez-Bencevi’s sworn confession—
planned to testify that in his opinion, the man seen on the video could not
actually have been Jiménez-Bencevi.136 The prosecution objected and
argued that the existence of Jiménez-Bencevi’s confession proved that his
attorney knew that he was guilty and that defense counsel thus should not
be permitted to call to the stand an expert whose opinion defense counsel
knew was false.137
The trial court responded by effectively precluding the defense from
calling the expert witness. It advised the defense that if the expert witness
offered his (presumably mistaken) opinion, the court would reveal to the
witness and jury the contradictory substance of Jiménez-Bencevi’s
confession.138 The trial court explained that it “cannot in good conscience
allow an expert who has not been made aware of the proffer to give an
expert opinion on something where he’s missing evidence, he’s missing
facts,” because it “would then be in a sense part and parcel to the giving of
evidence that is not realistic or true.”139 When defense counsel later
revisited the issue, the trial court stated that even if the expert stood by his
opinion after learning of Jiménez-Bencevi’s admission, the court still would
not allow Jiménez-Bencevi to “use an expert to give an imprimatur of
expertise on something that [Jiménez-Bencevi] know[s] is totally false.”140
On appeal, the First Circuit rejected this reasoning and reversed JiménezThe appellate panel first examined the
Bencevi’s conviction.141
requirement, imposed by Model Rule 3.3(a), that attorneys not knowingly
offer false evidence.142 The court noted that this rule applies only when an
131. Id. at 9–10.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id.
134. Id. The proffer statement was governed by a waiver agreement substantively
identical for the purposes of this Note to the waiver agreements in Lauersen and Burnett. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text (excerpting the waiver agreement in Laursen); supra
note 120 (excerpting the waiver agreement in Burnett).
135. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 13.
136. See id. at 13–14.
137. Id. at 17–19.
138. Id. at 13–14.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 14 (alterations in original).
141. Id. at 20.
142. See supra Part I.B.
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attorney actually knows that evidence is false: mere belief, however strong,
does not suffice.143 The First Circuit then broke with Lauersen and Burnett
by concluding that the existence of Jiménez-Bencevi’s inculpatory proffer
statement did not necessarily establish his guilt as an incontrovertible fact
triggering Model Rule 3.3’s restriction.144 The panel found especially
persuasive Jiménez-Bencevi’s knowledge that he would face the death
penalty unless he convinced the prosecution to offer a lesser sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea.145 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated
admonishment that “death is different,”146 the court suggested that the mere
existence of capital charges may so forcefully pressure defendants to do
whatever they can to avoid execution as to call into question the veracity of
capital defendants’ pretrial confessions.147
The First Circuit went on to criticize and reject the trial court’s reluctance
to set aside its presumed knowledge of Jiménez-Bencevi’s guilt when
deciding whether to permit the defense’s forensic expert to testify.148 The
district judge had reasoned, in a remark focused on the judge’s duty to
conduct a trial that would uncover the truth,149 that he was bound by his
“obligation to make certain that the facts that come out are as truthful as
possible to the reality of the case. I cannot close my eyes to that reality. It
would be improper, wrong for me to do that, and I will not allow that.”150
The First Circuit found this reasoning deeply misguided. It pointed out that
evidentiary rules compel courts to “‘close their eyes’ to pertinent evidence
all the time”151: juries are not meant to learn or rely upon suppressed or
unduly prejudicial evidence, for example, regardless of the evidence’s
relevance.152 The Jiménez-Bencevi Court held that, despite its relevance,
the defendant’s confession “for all intents and purposes[] did not exist”—
and the trial court was indeed obliged to “close [its] eye[s]” to the
confession’s contents—unless the defendant contradicted his own
confession on the witness stand.153 The trial court’s knowledge that the
defendant had admitted guilt in a sworn statement thus did not alter its duty
to conceal inadmissible evidence from the jury, and the statement ought not
143. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 18; see also supra note 39 (describing the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct’s definition of knowledge as actual knowledge only).
144. See Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 18–19 (explaining that Jiménez-Bencevi initially
denied involvement in the crime; the credibility of the prosecution’s two eyewitnesses was
questionable; the defense’s (ostensibly mistaken) forensic expert was a former FBI agent
with twenty-five years’ experience; and that Jiménez-Bencevi was “desperate to avoid the
death penalty and the government was adamant that it would not consider any plea
agreement unless [he] admitted to all of the charges”). In addition, the court noted that the
forensic expert’s testimony would not have been dishonest, because his incorrect expert
opinion was sincerely held. See id.
145. Id. at 17.
146. Id. at 17 n.5 (collecting Supreme Court cases invoking this aphorism).
147. See id. at 17–18, 17 n.5.
148. See id. at 19 n.7.
149. Cf. supra Part I.C.1.
150. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 19 n.7.
151. Id.
152. Id. (discussing motions to suppress evidence and Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
153. Id. (second alteration in original).

2016]

FALSE DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL COURT

1341

have impacted the court’s evaluation of the defense’s attempt to elicit its
forensic witness’s sincerely held expert opinion.154
In Jiménez-Bencevi, the First Circuit chose not to confront directly
whether a defense attorney’s ethical duties preclude her from knowingly
advancing a false defense, instead limiting its holding to cases in which
defense counsel has a good-faith basis to believe that her client may be
innocent.155 But by giving voice to the tension in the false-defense context
between truth seeking and protecting defendants’ rights, the JiménezBencevi panel’s admonition to the court below that defendants’ rights can—
and indeed, regularly do—outweigh the criminal process’s truth-seeking
function bears directly on the false-defense dilemma. At very least, the
court’s underlying reasoning makes clear that judicial treatments of
knowingly false defenses must engage with both of these systemic aims
rather than simply presuming that the criminal process cannot abide defense
tactics that require a court to close its eyes to inadmissible knowledge of a
defendant’s guilt.
D. Poventud v. City of New York
In Poventud, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the viability
of a constitutional tort action against the City of New York and four New
York City police officers.156 The procedural posture of this case is
complex;157 many of the parties’ arguments and much of the en banc
court’s opinions addressed technical aspects of constitutional tort
doctrine.158 Underlying these arguments, however, was a disagreement as
to the nature and propriety of false defenses. Nine judges on the Second
Circuit endorsed the notion that Brady violations during Poventud’s first
prosecution undermined Poventud’s right to zealously defend himself, even
though he later pled guilty to the charges.159 Six judges dissented,
reasoning that Poventud’s guilty plea meant that he was actually guilty and
asserting that a guilty defendant has no right to falsely defend himself at
trial.160
154. See id. at 18–19, 19 n.7.
155. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
156. See Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 125–27 (2d Cir. 2014).
157. The case involved a vacated New York State criminal conviction; a plea deal
whereby Poventud pled guilty to the original charges in exchange for a sentence of time
served, enabling him to leave prison immediately; and a subsequent federal civil rights
action alleging Brady violations during Poventud’s initial prosecution. See id. at 126–27
(setting forth the case’s procedural history).
158. Specifically, the parties disagreed as to whether Poventud’s claims were barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a Supreme Court case holding that the federal civil
rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit actions at law that “necessarily have the
effect of challenging [an] existing state or federal criminal conviction[],” unless the
conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or “called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Poventud, 750 F.3d at 124. The central
issue addressed in Poventud was whether the defendant’s guilty plea prevented him from
satisfying this doctrinal requirement. See id.
159. See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.
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Judge Richard C. Wesley authored the majority opinion.161 Of particular
relevance, he noted, in dicta discussing the trial court’s ruling, that the court
below
incorrectly presume[d] that . . . the State could violate Poventud’s Brady
rights only if Poventud is an innocent man. . . . In this case, Poventud has
the right to argue to the jury that with the main State witness impeached,
he would have been acquitted based on reasonable doubt or convicted on
a lesser charge.162

Similarly, in a concurring opinion in which all nine judges in the majority
joined, Judge Raymond J. Lohier contrasted the notion that Poventud did
not actually commit the crime with his legal entitlement to be provided any
evidence that “would have tended to lead to a verdict of not guilty” of the
conduct to which Poventud later confessed.163 In finding that Poventud had
a right to contest facts the truth of which he later conceded by pleading
guilty, the Poventud majority recognized a right to mount a false defense, at
least under certain circumstances.
The panel’s six dissenters adopted a contrary view, rejecting any right to
mount a false defense and instead characterizing this purported right as a
right to commit perjury. In an opinion joined by all but one dissenter,
Judge Dennis Jacobs noted that “the undisclosed evidence here could only
have been useful to Poventud in one very particular way—to support an
inference that Poventud was elsewhere at the time of the crime. [However,]
Poventud has now solemnly admitted that this inference is wholly false.”164
Judge Jacobs argued that the majority’s holding wrongfully undermined
truth seeking by allowing Poventud to seek damages for nondisclosure of
“evidence [that] would have been helpful only to strengthen [a] perjurious
alibi.”165 On this view,
[a criminal defendant] cannot have it both ways: he cannot state that he is
guilty, that he was present on the day in question and participated in the
crime, but that he was nonetheless prejudiced at his trial by the
nondisclosure of evidence that could have helped him only by suggesting
that the accurate testimony of the victim should not be believed.166

In another opinion also joined by all but one dissenter, Judge Debra Ann
Livingston adroitly summarized this rejection of false defenses, criticizing
the majority’s holding as recognizing a “right to recompense for a denial of
the opportunity to commit perjury more successfully.”167 In Judge
Livingston’s estimation, Poventud’s claim failed precisely because “the
undisclosed evidence could only have helped him falsely deny” his guilt.168

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Poventud, 750 F.3d at 124–38.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 147 (Lohier, J., concurring).
Id. at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 165 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
Id. at 168.
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This pejorative language unmistakably conveys the dissenters’ view that the
courts should not permit such an outcome.
E. Lessons Learned
With the exception of the majority decision and concurrences in
Poventud,169 these four cases convey judicial discomfort with the notion
that the trial process might have a legitimate purpose contrary to truth
seeking. In effect, these opinions—excepting those authored by judges in
the Poventud majority—hold that the Model Rules impose severe tactical
restrictions on an attorney knowingly representing a guilty client and
suggest that an attorney in this position can do little more than passively put
the government to its proof. These cases’ scarce analyses indicate a lack of
recognition of the variety of false defense tactics, adopting instead an all-ornothing approach to the false-defense dilemma and, in so doing, revealing
superficial understandings of the professional conduct rules on which their
conclusions are based.170
IV. FALSE DEFENSES IN CONTEXT(S)
This part aims to build and improve upon the Lauersen, Burnett,
Jiménez-Bencevi, and Poventud Courts’ wanting analyses of false-defense
tactics171 by evaluating the variety of procedural circumstances in which
false defenses occur. It begins by considering the two ends of the ethical
spectrum of false-defense tactics, namely, putting the government to its
proof and knowingly eliciting or suborning false material testimony. This
part then turns to more challenging scenarios in which the ethics of
different types of false defenses are less clear. Rather than focusing strictly
on philosophical or theoretical concerns, this part emphasizes practical
ethical consequences of judges proscribing or permitting different false
defenses. This part then offers context-specific recommendations to
attorneys and judges about when and how to implement, allow, or forbid
them.
This part concludes that defense counsel’s dueling ethical roles and the
adversary process’s competing aims172 are best balanced by drawing a
distinction between false defenses arising from evidence known by defense
counsel to be false and false defenses involving false legal arguments. By
differentiating false evidence from false arguments, this part offers a more
nuanced approach to false defenses that comports with the ethical
requirements imposed by the Model Rules173 and affords workable,
practical guidance to courts and practitioners alike.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–15, 125–28 and accompanying text; supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.A.
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The Model Rules forbid knowingly introducing false lay or expert
testimony.174 However, false defense tactics that involve factually accurate
testimony175 or false legal arguments176 do not violate the Model Rules, and
they advance the adversary process’s aim of safeguarding defendants’
individual rights. This part, therefore, concludes that courts should permit
the latter category of false defenses. Though parsing permissible from
impermissible false defense tactics is challenging in certain scenarios,
courts and practitioners should embrace these varieties of false defenses as
ethical forms of zealous advocacy.
A. The Easy Boundary Cases
First, as set forth above,177 judges and ethicists agree that defense
attorneys always may submit to the fact-finder that the government has
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, even on behalf of an
indisputably guilty client.178 This must be so to safeguard defendants’
individual rights by reifying the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. It is not seriously disputed that courts should permit
defense counsel to engage in this tactic, which commonly amounts to the
minimum form of zealous representation required by Model Rule 1.3.179
Second, knowingly eliciting or suborning false material testimony is
forbidden by both criminal statutes180 and the Model Rules: it is clear that a
defense attorney never is permitted to resort to such tactics.181 It is
important again to note that this prohibition serves to prevent the fact-finder
from being influenced by false evidence, as opposed to false arguments
drawn from evidence not known by defense counsel to be untrue.

174. See infra Part IV.B.1.
175. See infra notes 185–90 and accompanying text.
176. See infra Part IV.B.2.
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 52, at 1064 (“The defendant . . . is presumed
innocent, the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
even the guilty accused has an ‘absolute constitutional right to remain silent’ and to put the
government to its proof.” (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964)));
Henning, supra note 63, at 271 (“It is universally accepted that the defense lawyer can put
the government to its proof—a process that could well result in a not-guilty verdict if a
crucial witness fails to appear or testifies poorly or if important physical evidence is
unavailable.”); see also supra Part III.A.
179. See supra Part II.A (introducing the tactic of putting the government to its proof);
see also supra Part I.A.1. (introducing Model Rule 1.3 and its requirements).
180. See 5 DEP’T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 119, tit. 9, no. 1752 (describing the
elements of the crime of subornation of perjury and citing relevant case law and rules of
professional conduct); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a
tribunal.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980);
Subin, supra note 6, at 126 & n.12. But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27–42 (1st ed. 1975) (arguing that defense attorneys should be
permitted knowingly to call to testify on their own behalf defendants who intend to commit
perjury).
181. See supra Part III.E.
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B. Shades of Gray: False Defenses in Specific Contexts
Having established these clear cases, this section delves into falsedefense tactics that require more nuanced legal, ethical, and policy analysis.
In so doing, this section first considers false defenses bearing on the
evidence presented at trial and then examines false defenses advanced
through arguments made by defense counsel to the jury. It concludes that
the Model Rules forbid tactics grounded in false evidence, which
undermine the trial process’s truth-seeking function without safeguarding
defendants’ individual rights. Tactics that rely on false arguments,
however, fall within the Model Rules and advance defendants’ individual
rights without distorting the factual material parsed by the jury as it seeks to
arrive at the truth. For this reason, courts should prohibit false-defense
tactics that knowingly rely upon false evidence and permit tactics
knowingly advanced through false arguments.
1. False Defenses Arising from False Evidence
This subsection considers false defenses that may result in false,
inaccurate, irrelevant, or misleading facts being presented to the jury. It
first discusses direct examination of lay witnesses182 and then discusses
direct examination of expert witnesses. It concludes that the Model Rules
prohibit defense counsel from knowingly eliciting factually inaccurate lay
testimony; but they permit defense counsel to elicit lay testimony not
known to be false, even if doing so undermines the adversary system’s goal
to arrive at the truth.
i. Lay Witnesses on Direct Examination
There are two types of lay witnesses whose testimony defense counsel
may use to advance an evidentiary false defense: a witness whose
testimony is sincere but incorrect, and a witness whose testimony is sincere
and correct but may be used to support a falsehood.
First, the sincere but incorrect lay witness earnestly believes a falsehood
to which he intends to testify in court. Such a witness may appear enticing
to a guilty defendant eager to benefit from the witness’s favorable,
nonperjurious testimony. Unfortunately for the guilty defendant, however,
his attorney cannot elicit this testimony without running afoul of a clear-cut
ethical restriction. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) forbids attorneys from offering
182. This subsection discusses direct examination. Regarding cross-examination,
commentators and courts universally agree that defense attorneys may seek to impeach and
undermine the credibility of witnesses who defense counsel know are testifying truthfully.
See Suni, supra note 14, at 1657–58, 1658 n.61; see also supra note 69 and accompanying
text (introducing the dogged cross-examination of a truthful witness as an instance of
drawing false inferences). Indeed, defense counsel likely must subject truthful witnesses to
dogged cross-examination to meet the duty of zealous advocacy. See supra Part I.A.1.
While doing so obfuscates the truth, it commonly is considered a necessary part of zealously
putting the government to its proof. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Courts
should continue to permit this widespread practice, which merits minimal discussion here.
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any “evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”183 This rule does not
distinguish sincere from insincere testimony.184 An attorney who knows
that a witness would testify to a falsehood therefore ethically may not elicit
or rely upon that false testimony. A judge should not hesitate to read the
plain language of Model Rule 3.3 as forbidding defense counsel from
engaging in this tactic.
Eliciting a sincere but incorrect lay witness’s testimony clearly impedes
the adversary process’s truth-seeking function, as defense counsel
knowingly calls such a witness in an effort to convince the jury of a false
proposition. Further, a defendant can point to no individual right advanced
by engaging in this tactic: our system does not afford criminal defendants a
legal or constitutional right to disprove the prosecution’s case by lying to
the jury. Using sincere but incorrect lay testimony to defend against a
criminal charge therefore serves no legitimate function relative to either of
these systemic aims.
Second, defense counsel may seek to use sincere and correct lay witness
testimony to knowingly support a false proposition. Such a witness appeals
to the guilty defendant for the same reason as the sincere but incorrect one:
the witness’s testimony again is earnest, nonperjurious, and bolsters the
defense’s case. Such testimony does not run afoul of Model Rule 3.3,
because no false evidence is submitted to the court. Perhaps for this reason,
courts that have addressed this scenario widely have agreed with the
conclusion reached in Michigan ethics opinion CI-1164185 that the Model
Rules permit attorneys to introduce truthful testimony even if that testimony
may be used to support a false proposition.186 So long as the witness’s
testimony comports with evidentiary rules governing relevance, unfair
prejudice, confusion, and the like,187 judges should adhere to the Michigan
ethics committee’s reminder that there is no ethical proscription against
suborning truthful testimony.188
The Model Rules thus impose no restriction on defense counsel calling a
lay witness to offer testimony that is both sincere and factually accurate.
Although this strategy, if successful, may impede truth seeking, it is a
means by which a defendant may exercise his individual right to a zealous
defense. Viewed through this lens, the Michigan ethics committee’s

183. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3).
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2015)
(applying with approval the holding of Michigan ethics opinion CI-1164).
187. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (relevance); id. 403 (unfair prejudice, confusion, and waste of
time); id. 404(a)(1) (character evidence); id. 404(b)(1) (evidence of prior bad acts).
188. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. It also is worth noting that a witness
who intentionally offers literally true but misleading testimony may commit obstruction of
justice. The Ninth Circuit famously addressed this dynamic in the U.S. government’s
prosecution of baseball star Barry Bonds for allegedly evasive testimony about his alleged
steroid use. See United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[M]isleading
or evasive testimony that is factually true can obstruct justice.”), rev’d on other grounds, 784
F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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conclusion that “[o]ne cannot suborn the truth”189 recognizes that the
adversary system protects this individual right by widely permitting
defenses based on truthful evidence rather than attempting to permit certain
types of truthful evidence but forbid others. In short, defendants’ rights
outweigh truth seeking in this context.190
ii. Expert Witnesses on Direct Examination
This Note now turns to defense counsel’s treatment of expert witnesses
on direct examination.
a. The Sincere but Incorrect Expert Witness
Unlike the straightforward ethical challenge inherent to lay witness
testimony, expert witnesses can pose more challenging scenarios, because
an expert’s testimony can be understood either as new evidence or as an
opinion derived from the information provided to the expert. This
characterization makes the application of Model Rule 3.3 to expert
testimony less clear.
Consider an expert witness unaware of a defendant’s guilt. Should a trial
court insist that this expert be made aware that the defendant is guilty?191
Expert witnesses testify merely to their opinion formed based on the
evidence and information provided to them, and an expert does not
necessarily testify directly to the truth or falsity of a disputed proposition.192
This unique evidentiary function193 may justify defense counsel furnishing
an expert only with information relevant to the expert’s inquiry.194 Defense
counsel then may allow the expert to draw his or her own independent
conclusions from that information—as the First Circuit directed in Jiménez-

189. Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-1164 (1987).
190. See, e.g., id.
191. See, e.g., supra Part III.C (describing the dilemma parsed by the courts in JiménezBencevi).
192. See, e.g., Mark I. Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony Under the Federal
Rules, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 239, 251–56 (2015) (distinguishing between “participating expert,”
“original knowledge expert,” and “assumption expert” witnesses and describing the nature of
their testimony). But see, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113,
1140 (characterizing “[t]he major function of experts” as “to create new evidence in the
form of expert opinions”).
193. Gross, supra note 192, at 1140 (“This is a unique feature of expert testimony—there
is no other context in which a witness can create new evidence about past events—and it
gives the expert witness a set of options that no other witness has.”).
194. Note that a defendant’s confession presumably is not relevant to an expert charged
with drawing conclusions from objective evidence. For example, an expert comparing a
defendant’s fingerprint to a fingerprint collected from a crime scene should reach the same
conclusion whether or not that defendant has admitted guilt. Applying this principle to
Jiménez-Bencevi, the forensic expert in that case simply investigated whether a surveillance
video in fact depicted the defendant: that video’s contents did not change when
Jiménez-Bencevi proffered his guilt to prosecutors before trial. See supra notes 131–36 and
accompanying text.
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Bencevi when it instructed the trial court to “close its eyes” to the
defendant’s inadmissible confession of guilt.195
Further, the unique role of the expert witness may mean that an attorney
who knowingly elicits an expert’s false opinion does not violate Model
Rule 3.3. Because an expert does not speak dishonestly by stating an
earnestly held opinion, defense counsel arguably does not elicit false
testimony by putting a sincere expert on the stand.196 However, the unique
authority vested in expert witnesses militates against permitting defense
counsel to knowingly induce them to testify to false conclusions, because a
witness vested with expert authority generally is more likely to convince a
jury of his factually inaccurate opinion.197
Whether a court should permit defense counsel knowingly to elicit the
testimony of a sincere but incorrect expert witness ultimately turns on
whether the court views expert opinions as more like a lay witness’s
testimony—permitted if the testimony is sincere and accurate198—or more
like other evidence—impermissible if the attorney knows it to be false.199
In practice, this distinction might turn in part on the precise way in which
an expert witness presents his or her conclusions to the jury. For example,
if an attorney knows her client is guilty, Model Rule 3.3 prohibits her from
inducing a witness to attest inaccurately to the client’s innocence per se,
even if the witness’s testimony is sincere.200 This proscription applies to
expert and lay witnesses in equal measure.201 Thus, defense counsel
ethically cannot induce an expert witness to, for example, state that “the
defendant is not the man in the video” if the attorney knows to the contrary.
Alternatively, an expert might state, “in my opinion, the defendant is not the
man in the video”; but if defense counsel knows the expert’s opinion is
incorrect, a truth-seeking judge202 may be disinclined to permit even this
qualified testimony. In these scenarios, Model Rule 3.3’s proscription
against submitting false evidence controls.203
But what if an expert witnesses opines, for example, that “based on the
information provided to me, the man in the video is approximately six
inches taller than the defendant”? By adding this clause, the expert now has
testified sincerely and accurately without making any statement that the
195. United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 19 n.7 (1st Cir. 2015); see also supra
Part III.C.
196. See, e.g., Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 19 (concluding that because the defense
expert’s opinion was sincerely held, defense counsel should be permitted to present and cast
as reliable to the jury the expert’s (presumably) factually incorrect testimony).
197. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future,
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (1995) (“[Their role and authority] make experts important
witnesses in every case. The extensive testifying experience of many experts makes them
not only powerful, but also persuasive witnesses, capable of making or destroying a case.”).
198. See supra Part IV.B.1.i (discussing false defense tactics arising from lay witness
testimony).
199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
200. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part II.A.
203. See supra Part I.A.1.
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attorney knows to be false (provided that defense counsel furnished the
expert with all relevant information at her disposal).204 Yet the practical
impact of the expert’s testimony on the fact-finder may be the same no
matter which clause precedes the witness’s conclusion. From one
perspective, defense counsel has violated the spirit of Model Rule 3.3
through an artful turn of phrase unlikely to lessen the force of her expert’s
testimony. From a different view, courts may hesitate to prevent defense
counsel from introducing testimony that, like the alibi witness discussed in
Michigan ethics opinion CI-1164,205 is neither false nor misleading on its
own terms, even if that testimony impedes the jury from arriving at the
truth.206
On balance, the approach charted by the First Circuit in Jiménez-Bencevi
is persuasive.207 So long as an expert is aware of all relevant information, a
court that “closes its eyes” to inadmissible evidence best ensures that the
criminal process functions fairly and properly.208 If nothing else, regardless
of its conclusion, a court faced with this dilemma should carefully and
thoughtfully consider the issues brought to the fore by the Jiménez-Bencevi
Panel and seek to avoid the pitfalls encountered by the lower court in that
case when it simply rejected the expert’s testimony out of hand.209
b. The Sincere and Correct Expert Witness
Whose Testimony Supports a Falsehood
Another related and thorny issue arises when an attorney knowingly
introduces an expert witness’s sincere and accurate opinion, supporting a
truthful proposition, to bolster a falsehood through subsequent legal
argument.210 A skillful advocate able to extract a carefully circumscribed
expert opinion could generate expert testimony that is neither untruthful nor
factually inaccurate and then, for example, knowingly draw a false
inference from that testimony in hopes of securing an acquittal. In JiménezBencevi, for instance, defense counsel could have induced a forensic expert
to testify that, based on the information at the expert’s disposal, the man on
the surveillance video was taller than the defendant. Rather than simply
using this testimony to point out weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, the
attorney then could have relied on this testimony to affirmatively and
falsely argue actual innocence or shift blame onto an innocent third party.
Such tactics again present a close question. Standing alone, each of these
steps could be deemed ethically permissible; but in combination they may
mislead the fact-finder in the very ways that the Model Rules strive to
prevent. When false-defense tactics compound to create new, misleading
evidence, courts should prohibit the practice. By way of illustration,
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra note 194 (discussing what constitutes relevant information in this context).
See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 189–90.
See supra note 204.
See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text.
For analysis of false defenses made through legal arguments, see infra Part IV.B.2.
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defense counsel in Jiménez-Bencevi would not be permitted to call an
expert to testify—sincerely but inaccurately—that, in the expert’s opinion
based on the information provided to him, the man on the surveillance
video was the defendant’s brother—and then affirmatively argue that the
brother committed the crime.211 Here, the defense attorney does not merely
use the expert’s testimony to emphasize ways in which the jury may have
reasonable doubt. Instead, she advances the expert’s opinion as though it
were true despite knowing of its falsity, violating Model Rule 3.3 by
knowingly submitting false evidence to the court.212 This tactic clearly
undermines truth seeking, and because a defendant has no right to defend
himself by lying to the jury, it does not implicate the adversary system’s
function to safeguard individual rights.
Courts thus should permit defense counsel to put the government to its
proof by highlighting deficiencies in the prosecution’s case;213 but they
should seek to draw the line where attorneys knowingly generate favorable
false testimony to employ that testimony as a sword against the prosecution,
rather than a shield.
2. False Defenses Arising from Legal Arguments
Having evaluated tactics trafficking in evidence, this subsection turns to
false defenses that involve legal arguments knowingly advancing or
suggesting false propositions.214 Consider first the tactic of drawing false
inferences.215 Scholars have parsed false inferences into two types: those
advanced to make plain the prosecution’s failure to prove its case and those
advanced for their purported factual accuracy.216 False inferences of the
former kind properly are understood as a necessary extension of every
defendant’s right to put the government to its proof.217 From this
perspective, if defense counsel always may argue the government has not
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, then she always should be
permitted to point to the specific reasons why this is so, even when she
knows her client is guilty. This conclusion follows both logically and also
in light of the narrative approach that juries commonly follow during
deliberations.218 Because the side presenting the more compelling story is
more likely to prevail,219 prohibiting defense counsel from drawing false
211. Such an argument would constitute what Professor Imwinkelried labels the “SODDI
Defense 2.0.” See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 83.
212. See supra note 183 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.1.
213. See supra Part II.A.
214. A defense attorney presents legal arguments during summation. She also may
convey the substance of an argument through the tone and content of questions posed to
witnesses on direct and cross-examination. For an example of the relevance and potential
effect of an advocate’s specific language and tone in this context, see Subin, Is This Lie
Necessary?, supra note 50, at 692.
215. See supra Part II.B.
216. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 71.
219. See supra note 71.
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inferences from properly introduced evidence—in other words, preventing
the defense from making plain to the jury specific ways in which the
prosecution has not overcome reasonable doubt—disadvantages the defense
by lowering the high probative hurdle otherwise placed before the
prosecution in every criminal case. False inferences of this type obfuscate
the truth in the case of the guilty client, but their importance to the
adversary process’s function to safeguard individual rights militates
strongly in favor of permitting defense counsel to advance them in court.
Returning to the practical realm, this form of false inference also should
not be read to run afoul of the Model Rules. For one, the lack of
disciplinary proceedings brought as a result of this tactic evidences that it
falls within “conventional professional understandings” of ethical attorney
conduct.220 In addition, the procedurally distinct function of an attorney’s
legal arguments to the jury supports the notion that “a criminal defense
lawyer’s jury summation arguing for the acquittal of a client whom he
knows to be guilty . . . [should] be viewed as [an] assertion[] of the client’s
legal position or of conclusions that arguably should be drawn from the
facts put before the court,”221 rather than as “false statement[s] of fact or
law” prohibited by Model Rule 3.3.222
Some false inferences of the second type—those advanced for their
purported truth223—stand on shakier ethical ground and may be more
difficult to identify in practice. Dogged cross-examination of witnesses
known to be truthful is a widely accepted practice.224 But without taking
care to ground her comments in the evidence, defense counsel’s conduct
may elide into simply making false statements in violation of Model Rule
3.3.225 Here, the connection between the defense attorney’s inference and
the evidence is thin: the attorney no longer infers from the evidence as
much as attempts to convince the jury of a falsehood not supported by the
evidence. Courts should intervene when defense attorneys simply may be
peddling unsupported falsehoods to the jury.226 But so long as an
attorney’s assertions remain grounded in the evidence, a court should
permit defense counsel to defend a guilty client by advancing false
inferences that serve to lay bare weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.

220. See Green, supra note 81, at 367–69 (arguing that, to the extent that criminal
obstruction of justice statutes may suggest otherwise, those statutes reflect neither the rules
governing attorney conduct nor what Green describes as “the lore of the profession”).
221. Id.
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also Green,
supra note 81, at 369; Suni, supra note 14, at 1662–63, 1663 n.91 (advising that false
inferences in this context “do[] not appear to rise to the level of a Rule 3.3 violation,” and
arguing that false inferences of this type do not run afoul of the defense advocate’s duty to
refrain from dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative conduct as an officer of the
court).
223. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 182.
225. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing defense attorneys’ duty to serve as officers of the
court).
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The same distinction between a false defense advanced to rebut the
prosecution’s evidence and one offensively advanced for its purported
truthfulness227 applies to the tactic of arguing a guilty client’s actual
innocence. If defense counsel’s argument arises from the admitted
evidence, courts should apply the same logic set forth above with respect to
false inferences228 to differentiate a legal argument from the types of false
statement proscribed by Model Rule 3.3.229 A permissible actual innocence
defense of this type identifies particular facts adduced at trial and constructs
from them a plausible narrative in which the defendant did not commit the
crime. Professor Bruce A. Green’s suggestion that arguments of this type
are best characterized as legal positions rather than statements of fact230 is
as compelling in this context as in the case of false inferences. Simply put,
attorneys and judges should view both tactics as permissible means of
actively putting the government to its proof.231
Unlike the other false defense tactics this Note considers, blame shifting
in the case of a guilty client deliberately implicates an innocent third party
in criminal activity. This undercuts potential justifications of the tactic
focused on values like advancing defendants’ dignity and autonomy or
inspiring confidence in the criminal process: a defense attorney who uses
this tactic simply shifts the harms caused by a criminal prosecution from a
guilty client onto someone who does not deserve them.232 Several scholars
have advanced this concern—although others more focused on “the strength
of the systemic justifications for aggressive advocacy” would shift blame
from a guilty client without compunction.233 In her article devoted to the
blame-shifting tactic, Professor Suni explains that, while reasonable minds
have differed regarding shifting blame from a guilty client, the rules of
professional conduct seem not to prohibit doing so.234 This Note endorses
Suni’s well-reasoned conclusion that blame shifting falls within the bounds
of permissible zealous advocacy and that courts therefore should permit this
practice.235
CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to contextualize and synthesize the vibrant discourse
surrounding false defenses in order to offer concrete guidance to courts and
lawyers considering whether, when, why, and how attorneys should be
permitted to zealously defend guilty clients. In so doing, this Note aims to
improve upon the approach taken by courts that have treated false defenses
227. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 215–26 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (referencing Green’s argument that
conventional wisdom in the legal profession does not view defense counsel’s reliance on
false inferences as unethical attorney conduct).
232. See Suni, supra note 14, at 1658.
233. Id. at 1658 n.64.
234. See id. at 1659–74.
235. See id.
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as a monolithic category to be accepted or rejected in one fell swoop.236
Instead, following Jiménez-Bencevi’s237 and the Poventud majority’s238
lead, this Note strives to account for important differences among the
variety of tactics available to a defense attorney charged with knowingly
representing a guilty client. This accounting reveals that false defenses
knowingly advanced through false evidence impede truth seeking without
advancing legitimate individual rights. The Model Rules thus prohibit
defense counsel from knowingly eliciting false testimony from a lay or
expert witness, whether or not that testimony is sincere. The case of a
sincere and accurate expert witness whose testimony may be used to
support a falsehood presents a difficult question, but courts should permit
this tactic so long as defense counsel uses the expert’s opinion merely to
emphasize weaknesses in the prosecution’s case rather than knowingly
treating the expert’s opinion as though it were new evidence that supports a
false proposition.
The Model Rules’ restriction against introducing false evidence does not
apply to false defenses advanced through legal arguments. Defense counsel
advances the adversary system’s rights-protecting function by using a false
legal argument to highlight a deficiency in the prosecution’s case. For this
reason, this Note concludes that courts generally should embrace the tactics
of drawing false inferences, arguing actual innocence, and shifting blame as
instances of ethical—albeit dishonest—zealous advocacy, even though
these tactics impede truth seeking at trial.
Finally, this Note also strives to contribute much-needed depth and
perspective to real-world approaches to false defenses in the courts. The
constraints within which defense counsel representing a guilty client ought
to work will become clearer only through incisive, nuanced, and wellreasoned judicial interpretations of the boundaries delimiting ethical from
unethical false-defense tactics. Courts and practitioners hopefully will
delve more deeply into the ethics of different false defenses as the scenarios
this Note describes continue to arise in practice.

236. See supra Part III.A–B.
237. See supra Part III.C.
238. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.

